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National water governance and the privatisation paradox in Lebanon

A strategic analysis, 2005–2026

By Dr. Ghassan Chammas · Published 2026

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The paper traces the institutional evolution of Lebanese water management from the fragmented system of the early 2000s to 2026. Law 221 of 2000 consolidated 22 autonomous water offices and 209 local committees into four Regional Water Establishments, but local resistance and overlapping mandates left the establishments without full control of sources or budgets. Law 192 of 2020, the new Water Code, moved the sector towards integrated water resources management and introduced delegated management, though its implementing decrees remain incomplete.

The paper's central observation is a paradox of privatisation by default. The 2019 collapse eroded the tariff base and grid failures disrupted pumping, so households turned to an unregulated private market of tankers, bottled water and unlicensed wells. Conflict damage in the south and a severe drought have added to the pressure on the sector.

For policymakers and development finance institutions, the paper argues that well-structured concessions can bring this informal demand back into a regulated framework, combining private technical capacity with public ownership and the legal right to water.

Key findings

  • Annual household collections fell from about US$200 before 2019 to under US$20, below the dollar-denominated operating costs of the establishments.
  • Around 44% of households rely on water trucking and bottled water costing up to ten times the public service, and an estimated 100,000 unlicensed wells have been dug since the crisis began.
  • The National Water Sector Strategy 2024–2035 targets 838 million cubic metres of storage, 90% regular public water access, 60% of wastewater treated and full cost recovery for the establishments by 2028.
  • World Bank financing of US$257.8 million for the Second Greater Beirut Water Supply Project aims to meet 70% of dry-season demand for 1.8 million people, up from 24%.
  • The paper favours Affermage+ arrangements and performance-based contracts for non-revenue water reduction, which it reports are 68% more effective than public-sector efforts alone.
  • Its appendix proposes a 40-year concession with state ownership of fixed assets, an independent regulator, a non-revenue water target below 20%, lifeline tariffs and a Greater Beirut pilot.

Summary of the paper; the full analysis is in the PDF.

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